7. *Dialectic and Its Vicissitudes*

PERHAPS NOTHING is more revealing in the development of Soviet Marxism than its treatment of dialectic. Dialectical logic is the cornerstone of Marxian theory; it guides the analysis of the prerevolutionary as well as of the revolutionary development, and this analysis in turn is supposed to guide the strategy in both periods. Any fundamental "revision" of dialectical logic that goes beyond the Marxist application of dialectic to a new historical situation would indicate not only a "deviation" from Marxian theory (which is only of dogmatic interest) but also a theoretical justification for a change in the basic trend. Interpreters of Soviet theory have therefore correctly drawn attention to events in this sphere. They have concluded that Soviet Marxism has tuned down and arrested the dialectic in the interest of the ideological justification and protection of a regime which, according to dialectical logic, must appear as subject to being surpassed by the historical development. Chief support of this conclusion is seen in the emasculation of the transition from quantity to quality, the denial of explosive changes under socialism (the notion of "nonantagonistic contradictions"), in the reintroduction of formal logic, and in the disappearance

from the dialectical vocabulary of the "negation of the negation." [1] In point of fact, however, Soviet Marxism is nowhere more "orthodox" than in its painful elaboration of the dialectical method; we shall see that not one of the above mentioned innovations in itself runs counter to the Marxian (and even Hegelian) dialectical logic.

But while not a single of the basic dialectical concepts has been revised or rejected in Soviet Marxism, the function of dialectic itself has undergone a significant change: it has been transformed from a mode of critical thought into a universal "world outlook" and universal method with rigidly fixed rules and regulations, and this transformation destroys the dialectic more thoroughly than any revision. The change corresponds to that of Marxism itself from theory to ideology; dialectic is vested with the magical qualities of official thought and communication. As Marxian theory ceases to be the organon of revolutionary consciousness and practice and enters the superstructure of an established system of domination, the movement of dialectical thought is codified into a philosophical system. The more problematic the relation between dialectical and formal logic becomes, the more dialectic itself becomes formal logic. The difficulties of Soviet Marxism in producing an adequate "textbook" on dialectic and logic are not only of a political nature, but the very essence of dialectics rebels against such codification. This holds true for idealistic as well as materialist dialectics, for neither Hegel nor Marx developed dialectic as a general methodologi-

[1] See A. Philipov, *Logic and Dialectic in the Soviet Union* (New York, Research Program on the USSR, 1952), pp. 37 f.

cal scheme. The first step in this direction was made by Engels in his Dialectics of Nature (which he did not publish), and his notes have provided the skeleton for the Soviet Marxist codification.

Marx elaborated his dialectic as a conceptual tool for comprehending an inherently antagonistic society. The dissolution of the fixed and stable notions of philosophy, political economy, and sociology into their contradictory components was to "reflect" the actual structure and movement of history; dialectic was to reproduce in theory the essence of reality. And in order to reproduce it adequately, in order to provide an adequate theory of history, the traditional categories had to be redefined because they concealed rather than revealed what happened. However, the dialectical relation between the structure of thought and that of reality is more than reflection and correspondence. If Hegel consistently transgressed the clearly established distinction between thought and its object, if he talked of "contradictions" (a "logical" term) in reality, of the "movement" of concepts, of quantity "turning" into quality, he indeed stipulated not only correspondence but a specific "identity" between thought and its object—he assimilated the one with the other. But it may be assumed that the wisdom of his critics, who note that Hegel confused two essentially different realms, was not beyond the reaches of his intelligence and awareness. According to Hegel, the traditional distinction between thought and its object is "abstract" and falsifies the real relation. Thought and its object have a common denominator, which, itself "real," constitutes the substance of thought as well as of its object.

This common denominator is the inherent structure and the *telos* of all being, i.e., Reason. It is for Hegel the structure according to which all modes of being, subjective as well as objective, are modes of self-realization in an ever more conscious form—from the "blind" process of unorganic nature to the free realization of man in history. Reason is subjective as well as objective—the Logos of all being. It is dialectical in so far as the realization takes place through the development and solution of contradictions which define the various modes and conditions of being. Being is in its essence a process of "comprehending"—the process in which an object becomes what it is through constituting itself (as this particular object) in and against the various conditions and relations of its existence. By virtue of this process, existence becomes comprehending, the object becomes "subject," and comprehending, the "notion" (*Begriff*), becomes the essential "reality" of being. Self-conscious thinking is only the highest mode of an existence common to all being, and the movement of thought is only the highest and most general mode of the movement of all being. Hegel speaks of one notion turning into another, meaning that a notion, thought through, reveals contents which at first seem alien and even opposed to this notion. What happens is not that in the thought process one notion is replaced by another, by one more adequate to reality, but that the same notion unfolds its own content—a dynamic which *is* that of the reality comprehended in the notion. The reality has (or rather is) its own Logos and logic is ontology. Behind this apparent play with the equivocation of words lies the very idea which has been con-

stitutive of Western philosophy since the Greeks—the idea of the *Logos* as the essence of being, which in turn determines the logical structure of "definition" and makes "logic" into an instrument for finding and communicating the truth. No matter how inadequate the translation of Logos as "reason" may be, it elucidates the decisive implication of this idea, namely, that the order of the cosmos (nature as well as society, physics as well as history) is at one and the same time a logical and ontological, a comprehending and comprehended (*begreifende* and *begriffene*) order. Thus the cognitive relation is constitutive of reality, is subjective *and* objective. However, the unity of the subjective and objective world is not a fact, not a given condition, but one that is to be attained in the struggle against adverse, denying conditions. Once this struggle becomes the self-conscious mode of existence, namely, in the human being, the dialectical process becomes the historical process—theory and practice in one. It comes to fruition in a "state of the world" where the conflict is resolved in the transparent harmony of subject and object, individual and universal. This is the inner logic of philosophy as well as reality. The dialectical logic may thus be called a logic of *freedom*, or rather, to be more exact, a logic of *liberation*, for the process is that of an alienated world, whose "substance" can become "subject" (as the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* formulates the thesis of Hegel's philosophy) only through shattering and surpassing the conditions which "contradict" its realization. Then, however, Hegel's dialectic surpasses the historical process itself and makes it into a part of a metaphysical system

in which ultimate freedom is only the freedom of the Idea.

The Marxian "inversion" of Hegel's dialectic remains committed to history. The driving forces behind the historical process are not mere conflicts but contradictions because they constitute the very Logos of history as the history of alienation. Thus, according to Marx, (the Logos of) capitalist society speaks against itself: Its economy functions normally only through periodic crises; growing productivity of labor sustains scarcity and toil; increasing wealth perpetuates poverty; progress is dehumanization. Specifically, as Marx claims to show in *Capital*, it is the free wage contract and the just exchange of equivalents which generate exploitation and inequality; it is the capitalist realization of freedom, equality, and justice which turns them into their opposite.[2] The rationality of the system is self-contradictory: the very laws which govern it lead to its destruction. As in Hegel's conception, the process of liberation appears not as an extraneous scheme superimposed upon reality but as its objective dynamic, and the latter is the realization of the free "subject," which now finds its historical form and task—that of the proletariat. Moreover, the Marxian dialectic also is, as a political-historical process, a *cognitive* one: the true consciousness (class consciousness) of the proletariat is a constitutive factor in the objective dynamic of liberation.

These brief comments on the structure of dialectic may illustrate the fate it underwent in Soviet Marxism. The Logos of dialectic is no longer that of liberation—neither in Hegel's ontological nor in Marx's historical sense. This

[2] *Capital*, I, Chap. 4, conclusion.

is inevitable once dialectic is no longer focused on the contradictions of class society but extended beyond them. As Marxian theory is transformed into a general scientific "world outlook," dialectic becomes an abstract "theory of knowledge." Although it is to pertain to the proletariat and the Communist Party,[3] the connection is no longer transparent. Now Marxian theory may perhaps be called a "world outlook," but then its world is that of "prehistory," class society, and, specifically, capitalist society. Marxian theory analyzes and criticizes this world in all its manifestations, in its material and intellectual culture. There is no Marxian theory which may be meaningfully called a "world outlook" for postcapitalist societies—whether they be socialist or not. There is no Marxian theory of socialism because the antagonistic-dialectical laws which govern presocialist history are not applicable to the history of free mankind, and theory cannot predetermine the laws of freedom. Nor does Marxian theory "prophesy" beyond demonstrable trends in capitalist society. The essentially historical character of Marxian theory precludes unhistorical generalizations. Although Engels defined dialectic as the "science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought," [4] he noted that nature as well as society are "phases of historical development," and that the laws of dialectic are "abstracted" from their history.[5] In such ab-

[3] See the report on the results of the discussion of logic in *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), 1951, No. 6, pp. 143–49.

[4] "Anti-Dühring," in *A Handbook of Marxism*, ed. by E. Burns (New York, International Publishers, 1935), p. 266.

[5] *Dialectics of Nature*, trans. by Clemens Dutt (New York, International Publishers, 1940), p. 26.

straction, they can be presented as a series of general assumptions, categories, and conclusions—but the general scheme immediately cancels itself, for its categories come to life only in their historical concretion.

Consequently, in trying to present dialectic "as such," Soviet Marxists can do nothing but distill from the concrete dialectical analysis of the "classics" certain principles, illustrate them, and confront them with "undialectical" thought. The principles are those enumerated in Stalin's "Dialectical and Historical Materialism," which, in turn, are only a paraphrase of Engels's propositions in his *Dialectics of Nature*.[6] In terms of Hegel's and Marx's dialectic, they are neither true nor false—they are empty shells. Hegel could develop the principles of dialectic in the medium of universality, as a "science of logic," because to him the structure and movement of being was that of the "notion" and attained its truth in the Absolute Idea; Marxian theory, however, which rejects Hegel's interpretation of being in terms of the Idea, can no longer unfold the dialectic as logic: its Logos is the historical reality, and its universality is that of history.

The problem as to whether or not the Marxian dialectic is applicable to nature must here at least be mentioned because the emphasis on the dialectic of nature is a distinguishing feature of Soviet Marxism—in contrast to Marx and even to Lenin. If the Marxian dialectic is in its conceptual structure a dialectic of the historical reality, then it includes nature in so far as the latter is itself part of the

[6] *Ibid.* For the "omission" of the "negation of the negation" see below, pp. 153 f.

historical reality (in the interaction [*Stoffwechsel*] between man and nature, the domination and exploitation of nature, nature as ideology, etc.). But precisely in so far as nature is investigated in abstraction from these historical relations, as in the natural sciences, it seems to lie outside the realm of dialectic. It is no accident that in Engels's "Dialectics of Nature" the dialectical concepts appear as mere analogies, figurative and superimposed upon the content—strikingly empty or commonplace compared with the exact concreteness of the dialectical concepts in the economic and socio-historical writings. And it is the *Dialectics of Nature* which has become the constantly quoted authoritative source for the exposition of dialectic in Soviet Marxism. Inevitably so, for if "dialectic reigns everywhere," [7] if it is the science of the "general laws of the material world and of knowledge," [8] and therefore the only true "scientific world outlook," then the dialectical concepts must first and foremost be validated in the most scientific of all sciences—that of nature. The consequence is a deemphasis of history.

The Soviet Marxist hypostatization of dialectic into a universal scientific world outlook entails the division of Marxian theory into dialectical and historical materialism, the latter being the "extension" and "application" of the former to the "study of society and its history." [9] The divi-

[7] K. S. Bakradze, "K voprosu o sootnoshenii logiki i dialektiki" (On the Relationship Between Logic and Dialectic), *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), 1950, No. 2, p. 200.

[8] V. S. Molodtsov, "Ob oshibkakh v ponimanii predmeta dialekticheskogo materializma" (On False Conceptions of the Subject of Dialectical Materialism), *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), 1956, No. 1, p. 188.

[9] Stalin, "Dialectical and Historical Materialism," in *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York, International Publishers, 1939), p. 105.

sion would have been meaningless to Marx, for whom dialectical materialism was synonymous with historical materialism. In Soviet Marxism, historical materialism becomes one particular branch of the general scientific and philosophical system of Marxism which, codified into an ideology and interpreted by the officials of the Party, justifies policy and practice. History, which in Marxian theory is the determining and validating dimension of dialectic, is in Soviet Marxism a special field in which historical as well as suprahistorical laws assert themselves. The latter, arranged into a system of propositions, are presented as the ultimately determining forces in history as well as nature. The dialectical process thus interpreted is no longer in a strict sense a historical process—it is rather that history is reified into a second nature. Soviet developments thereby obtain the dignity of the objective natural laws by which they are allegedly governed and which, if correctly understood and taken into consciousness, will eventually right all wrongs and lead to final victory over the opposing forces.

But while the objective, determinist character of dialectical laws is thus strengthened, Soviet Marxism in reality appears as defying determinism and practicing voluntarism. The shift in emphasis from the former to the latter seems to be a feature of Leninism and seems to culminate in Stalinism. A straight road seems to lead from Lenin's "consciousness from without" and his notion of the centralized authoritarian party to Stalin's personal dictatorship—a road on which "scientific determinism" gives way (in practice, if not in ideology) to decisions on the ground of shifting political and even personal objectives and in-

terests. Subjective factors prevail over the objective factors and laws. However, closer analysis shows that the abstract opposition of determinism and voluntarism is untenable; their interrelation is more complex and requires discussion to the extent that it sheds light on the socio-historical changes reflected in Soviet Marxism.

The two elements are present from the beginning in the Marxian doctrine; their relative weight depends on the historical conditions under which Marxism operates.[10] In periods of acute class struggles, when the revolution is "on the agenda" and when a mature, class-conscious proletariat is in political action, Marxism appears as little more than the conscious manifestation of objective factors. In so far as the latter tend "by themselves" toward revolution, in so far as the capitalist structure is shaken by economic crises and political upheavals, Marxism can interpret the situation chiefly in terms of the harmony of the subjective and objective factors. The function of the Marxist parties and of their leadership and international organization then is to comprehend and explain the objective constellation of political forces and to direct the action of the proletariat in accordance with it. This function is a subjective factor: itself cognition and volition, it appeals to cognition and volition. However, as a subjective factor, it is only the formulation of the objective factors, which, directing the political action, becomes an integral part and aspect of them. In contrast, when the revolutionary potential is weakened, absorbed, or defeated, then the cognitive and voluntarist element is not embodied in the objective situation.

[10] For the following see above, pp. 17 f.

The consciousness and action of the proletariat then are largely determined by the "blind laws" of the capitalist process instead of having broken through this determinism. Consequently, the party, or rather the party leadership, appears as the historical repository of the "true" interests of the proletariat and above the proletariat, working by dictum and decree, and the proletariat becomes the object of these decisions. The subjective and objective factors are torn asunder—in reality, and this development appears in theory as the tension and antagonism between voluntarism and determinism.

It has often been noted that Marxian theory underwent a significant change after 1848. The philosophic humanism of the earlier writings, in which socialism is defined in terms of human aspirations and potentialities, gave way to a "scientific socialism governed by inexorable objective laws." [11] The transformation reflects the actual situation of the proletariat. The determinist elements in Marxian theory pertain to the structure of class society and particularly to capitalism, where men are subordinated to unmastered forces, operating "behind the back of the individuals" as inexorable laws. The abortive revolutions of 1848 and the ensuing consolidation of bourgeois society reasserted the "validity" of these laws, to which the bulk of the proletariat also succumbed. While Marxian theory reflects this extended determinism by increasing emphasis on the scientific character of the dialectic toward socialism, the "voluntarist" element comes to reside in a separate

[11] See Leonard Krieger, "Marx and Engels as Historians," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIV, No. 3 (June, 1953), 396 ff.

historical agency or agent, that is, in the leadership. The "true" consciousness is that which has not succumbed to the "false" determinism. But no matter how great the distance may be between the consciousness of the leadership and that of the proletariat, the former, in its theory and practice, must retain or reestablish the demonstrable connection between the "immediate" and the "real" interest of the proletariat. This relation between a highly centralized leadership and the proletariat which remains its determining base is illustrated in the period of the First International. At that time, the ideas, objectives, and attitudes of the leadership were remote from those of the proletariat and certainly not shared or even understood by the great majority of the latter. Still, the Inaugural Address, the analyses of the Paris Commune, and the communications of the leadership testify to the extent to which the factual attitude and actions of the proletariat determined the leadership's theory and strategy.

Subsequently, as ever larger strata of the industrial proletariat were installed in the capitalist system and partook of its benefits, the "natural laws" governing the system also seemed to engulf its negation. Revisionist Marxism affirmed this process. Dialectic was discarded. Eduard Bernstein's doctrine implied a determinism far more rigid than that of Marx and Engels. The subjective factor was objectified at the expense of its revolutionary content and intent: the proletariat moved—with the whole of society—under objective laws toward socialism, and the leadership operated under the same laws. We have tried to show above how Leninism attempted to restore the true

relation between the subjective and objective factors by establishing the authority of the centralized revolutionary party over and above the proletariat. Again, the strengthening of the voluntarist element was accompanied by a strengthening of the determinist character of Marxian theory: Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* replaced the dialectical notion of truth by a primitive naturalistic realism, which has become canonical in Soviet Marxism. However, in Leninism, the two factors remained closely related: during the Revolution, it became apparent to what degree Lenin had succeeded in basing his strategy on the actual class interests and aspirations of the workers and peasants. At the same time, the dialectic was reactivated and provided the conceptual tools for Lenin's guiding analyses of the historical situation. Then, from 1923 on, the decisions of the leadership have been increasingly dissociated from the class interests of the proletariat. The former no longer presuppose the proletariat as a revolutionary agent but rather are imposed upon the proletariat and the rest of the underlying population. The authoritarian voluntarism which characterized the Stalinist leadership responds to the objective determinant, the reduction of the revolutionary potential in the capitalist countries. And as the will of the leadership acts upon the proletariat from above, the theory pronounced by the leadership or endorsed by it assumes rigid determinist forms. The dialectic is petrified into a universal system in which the historical process appears as a "natural" process and in which objective laws over and above the individuals govern not only the capitalist but also the socialist society. The

fate of the dialectic reveals the historical substance of Soviet society: it is not the negation of capitalism, but it partakes, in a decisive aspect, of the function of capitalism, namely, in the industrial development of the productive forces under separation of the control of production from the "immediate producers." Soviet theory here expresses what the ideology denies: that the Bolshevik Revolution did "not yet" entail a socialist revolution, that the "first phase" is not yet socialism. But while Soviet society thus partakes of the function of capitalism, it does so on an economic foundation—total nationalization—which makes for an essentially different developmental tendency beyond the present framework, in a direction which we shall subsequently try to identify. Now, we shall briefly illustrate the petrification of the dialectic and the points at which the future trend seems to become manifest.

The exposition of the dialectic in the representative textbooks is focussed on the determinist character of the dialectical process. For example, in Rozental's *Marksistskii Dialekticheskii Metod* (Marxist Dialectical Method), the capitalist development, the transition to socialism, and the subsequent development of Soviet society through its various phases is presented as the unfolding of a system of objective forces that could not have unfolded otherwise. To be sure, strong and constant emphasis is placed on the guiding role of the Communist Party and its leaders, and on the patriotic heroism of the Soviet people, but their action and its success was made possible only by their understanding of and obedience to the inexorable laws of dialectic. The subjective factor no longer appears as an in-

tegral element and stage of the objective dialectic, but rather as the mere vessel, recipient, or executor of the latter. This notion has remained obligatory during and after the Stalinist era. The Party and the Party leadership are the sole authority for the interpretation of dialectic—but this independence is qualified: the leaders themselves are subject to the objective laws which they interpret and implement.

> The particular role of ideology in socialist society is determined by the nature of the development of this society, which differs essentially from the nature of the development of previous [social] formations. Under socialism, too, the laws of the social development are objective ones, *operating independently from the consciousness and will of human beings*, but under socialism, the party, the state, and society as a whole have the opportunity, unknown in past history, of comprehending these laws, consciously applying them in their activities, and, by this very token, accelerating the course of societal development.[12]

The Soviet Marxist interpretation of the relation between the subjective and objective factor transforms the dialectical process into a mechanistic one. This becomes particularly clear in the discussion of the relation between necessity and freedom. It is the key problem in the Hegelian as well as the Marxian dialectic, and we have seen that it is also a key problem in the idea of socialism itself. Soviet Marxism defines freedom as "recognized necessity."[13]

[12] M. T. Iovchuk, "Rol' sotsialisticheskoi ideologii v bor'be s perezhitkami kapitalizma" (The Role of Socialist Ideology in the Struggle with Survivals of Capitalism), *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), 1955, No. 1, p. 4 (italics added). Emphasis on the subordination of the Soviet state to the objective laws of the historical process is one of the essential points in Stalin's last article; see above, p. 121.

[13] For example, M. D. Kammari, "O novom vydaiushchemsia vklade I. V.

The formula follows Engels's restatement of Hegel's definition according to which freedom is "insight into necessity." [14] But for Hegel, freedom is not merely "insight" into necessity, but is comprehended (*begriffene*) necessity, which implies a change in the actual conditions. Mere "insight" can never change necessity into freedom; Hegel's "comprehended" necessity is "not merely the freedom of abstract negation, but rather concrete and positive freedom" —only thus is it the "truth" of necessity. The transition from necessity to freedom is that into a fundamentally different dimension of "being," and Hegel calls it the "hardest" of all dialectical transitions.[15]

Soviet Marxism minimizes this transition and assimilates freedom to necessity—in ideology as well as in reality. This assimilation is expressed in the Soviet Marxist interpretation of dialectical change, that is, of the development from one stage of class society to another. In Marxian theory, this development is (*a*) *catastrophic* (the unfolding contradictions of class society can be resolved only by explosion), and (*b*) as catastrophic development it is *progressive* (the stage initiated by the revolution is a higher stage of civilization). However, both these elements are themselves subjective as well as objective factors. The "explosion" is not automatic but presupposes the action and the consciousness of the revolutionary class; and

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Stalina v marksistsko-leninskuiu filosofiiu" (On the Distinguished New Contribution by J. V. Stalin to Marxist-Leninist Philosophy), *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), 1952, No. 6, p. 32.

[14] "Anti-Dühring," in *Handbook of Marxism*, pp. 255 f.

[15] *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, I, par. 158 and 159; *Science of Logic*, Book II, Sect. 3, Chap. 3, C.

"progress" denotes only the development of the productive forces and continues to involve exploitation and enslavement until the proletariat has become the historical agent.[16]

Into this conception, Soviet Marxism introduces the distinction between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions ("conflicts" and "contradictions"):[17] the former irreconcilable and "soluble" only through a catastrophic explosion; the latter subject to gradual solution through political control; the former characteristic of class society, the latter characteristic of socialist society. Soviet Marxism claims that the change from the explosive to the gradual dialectical transition has been rendered possible in the USSR with the establishment of the Soviet state. In line with this conception, and following Stalin's example of 1938, the "law of the negation of the negation" disappeared from the list of the fundamental dialectical laws. Quite obviously, the Soviet Marxist conception of dialectic is most suitable to serve the ideological stabilization of the established state: it assigns to the state the historical task of solving the "nonantagonistic contradictions" and pre-

[16] See for example, Marx to Ruge, September, 1843, in "Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher I," in Marx and Engels, *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. by D. Rjazonov (Frankfurt, Marx-Engels Archiv Verlagsgesellschaft, 1927), Div. I, I, Pt. 1, 575; and Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York, International Publishers, 1939), p. 7.

[17] See for example M. M. Rozental, *Marksistskii dialekticheskii metod* (Marxist Dialectical Method) (Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1951), *passim;* S. P. Dudel, "K voprosy o edinstve i bor'be protivepolonovsti: kak vnutrennem soderzhanii protsessa razvitia" (On the question of the Unity and Struggle of Opposites as the Content of the Process of Development), in *Voprosy Dialekticheskogo Materializma* (Questions of Dialectical Materialism) (Moscow, Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1951) pp. 73 ff. The Soviet Marxist doctrine of dialectical contradictions took final shape after Zhdanov's speech against G. F. Aleksandrov, June 1947, printed in *Bol'shevik* (Bolshevik), 1947, No. 16 (August 30) pp. 7–23.

cludes theoretically the necessity of another revolution on the way to communism. It should be noted, however, that the Soviet Marxist revision is theoretically consistent with the Marxian conception. According to Marx, the "catastrophic" character of the transition from quantity to quality belongs to the realm of blindly operating, uncontrolled socio-economic forces; with the establishment of socialism, these forces come under the rational control of society as a whole, which self-consciously regulates its struggle with nature and with its own contradictions. Moreover, the change in the mode of transition from one stage to another is already stipulated in Hegel's system: once the level of free and self-conscious rationality has been reached ("being-in-and-for-itself"), such rationality also governs the further transitions at this level. Similarly, Marx applied the notion of the "negation of the negation" specifically to the capitalist development. It is the "capitalist production" which, with the necessity of a "law of nature" engenders its own negation: socialism is this "negation of the negation." [18] The dialectical method does not stipulate the schematic repetition of this concept, and Hegel warns explicitly against the formalistic interpretation and application of the "triad." [19] The Soviet Marxist "revision" is "orthodox." Since Soviet Marxists maintain that Soviet society is a socialist society, they consistently invest it with the corresponding dialectical characteristics. What is involved is not so much a revision of dialectic as the claim of socialism for a nonsocialist society. Dialectic itself is used for substantiating this claim.

[18] *Capital*, I, Chap. 24. [19] *Science of Logic*, Book III, Sect. 3, Chap. 3.

All this seems to confirm that the Soviet Marxist treatment of dialectic merely serves to protect and justify the established regime by eliminating or minimizing all those elements of dialectic which would indicate progress of the socio-historical development beyond this regime, that is, toward a qualitatively different higher stage of socialism. In other words, Soviet Marxism would represent the "arresting" of dialectic in the interest of the prevailing state of affairs—the ideology would follow the arresting of socialism in reality.

However, the situation is more complicated. We have noted at the beginning that Soviet ideology and reality are subject to a dynamic which the regime cannot arrest without undermining its own foundations. We have suggested that the international development tends to force the Soviet regime to direct its efforts toward the "second phase" of socialism—a trend which would also tend to alter the "superstructure." In line with the assimilation of ideology to reality, the trend would not only be noticeable but perhaps even anticipated in ideology. Recent developments in the Soviet Marxist treatment of dialectic seem to corroborate this assumption. Even during the last period of Stalinism, it appeared that ideological preparations were being made for rendering the regime more flexible, for "normalizing" it and for orienting Soviet society toward a long period of economic as well as political "coexistence"—a period required for the further internal growth of the Soviet system. The Soviet Marxist discussion of dialectic seems designed to adjust the ideology to the new period.

We have mentioned Stalin's reiterated emphasis on the "active" role of the superstructure in developing its base; this is not merely the ideological justification and stabilization of a prevailing form and stage of the state but also the ideological commitment of the state to introduce changes in conformity with the growth of the productive forces. As such, Stalin's statement of 1950 pointed toward his "Economic Problems of Socialism" [20] of 1952, with the stress on the contradictions between productive forces and production relations in the USSR, to be solved "gradually" under the guidance of the state. Similarly, the discussion of logic and dialectic in 1950–1951 seems not so much an ideological defence of the status quo against potential change, a protection from historical progress, as a preparation for intended changes. The discussion of the relation between formal and dialectical logic was linked throughout with Stalin's pronouncements in "Marxism and Linguistic Problems." [21] There Stalin had pointed out that it is "un-Marxist" and incorrect to talk of the "class conditioning" of language and to envisage a specifically "socialist language." He had maintained that language "differs in principle from a superstructure" in that it does not change with the base but outlives this or that base; it is created by and "serves," not certain classes, but society as a whole over the course of centuries. By the same token, Soviet Marxism declared, it is incorrect to treat formal logic as "class conditioned" and to envisage a specific

[20] In *Current Soviet Policies, ed. by Leo Gruliow* (New York, F. A. Praeger, 1953), pp. 1–20.

[21] See Stalin, *Marksizm i voprosy iazykoznaniia* (Marxism and Linguistic Problems) (Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1950).

"Soviet logic" corresponding to the new basis of Soviet society.[22] The report on the results of the discussion on logic sums up:

> The logical forms and laws of thought are no superstructure over and above the base. . . . Formal logic is the science of the elementary laws and forms of correct thinking. . . . There are not two logics: an old metaphysical, and a new, dialectical logic. . . . There is only one formal logic, which is universally valid.[23]

Dialectical logic does not deny, cancel, or contradict the validity of formal logic; the former belongs to a different dimension of knowledge and is related to the latter as higher to elementary mathematics.

We are not concerned here with the course and conclusions of the discussion.[24] Significantly, the changing trend announces itself in a return to Marxian orthodoxy after the leftist "Marrist deviations." In terms of Marxian theory, neither language nor logic as such belong to the superstructure; they belong rather to the preconditions of the basic societal relationships themselves: as instruments of communication and knowledge, they are indispensable for establishing and sustaining these relationships. Only certain manifestations of language and thought are superstructure, as for example, in art, philosophy, religion. Following the Marxian conception, the Soviet discussion dis-

[22] V. I. Cherkesov, "O logike i marksistskoi dialektike" (On Logic and Marxist Dialectic), *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), 1950, No. 2, p. 211.

[23] *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), 1951, No. 6, pp. 145, 146.

[24] They are summarized, in *ibid.*, pp. 143–49, and in Gustav Wetter, *Der Dialektische Materialismus* (Freiburg, Herder, 1952), pp. 544 ff. For the post-Stalin development see George L. Kline, "Recent Soviet Philosophy," in American Academy of Political Science, *Annals*, CCCIII (January, 1956), 126–38.

tinguished between logic itself and the *sciences* of logic. As a specific interpretation of logic, some of the latter must be classified as ideological.[25] Neither the Hegelian nor the Marxian dialectic denied the validity of formal logic; rather they preserved and validated its truth by unfolding its content in the dialectical conception which reveals the necessary abstractness of "common" as well as "scientific" sense.

Compared with this tradition of dialectic, "Marrist" [26] linguistic and logic (which stressed to the extreme the class character of both) must indeed appear as a gross "leftist deviation," as an "infantile disease" of communism in its age of immaturity. It seemed to be an ideological by-product of the first phase of the Stalinist construction of socialism in one country. The violent struggle to overcome the technological and industrial backwardness of the country, imposed by terror upon a largely passive and even hostile population, found its ideological compensation in the various doctrines of the uniqueness and superiority of Soviet man, deriving from his "possession" of Marxism as the only true and progressive "world outlook." But Marxian theory is in its very substance international. Within its framework, nationalism is progressive only as a stage in the historical process—a stage which, according to Marx and Engels, had already been surpassed by the advanced Western world. Soviet Marxism has never suc-

[25] I. I. Osmakov, "O zakone myshleniia i o nauke logiki" (On the Law of Thinking and on the Science of Logic), *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), 1950, No. 3, pp. 318 ff.

[26] Only the Stalinist evaluation of Marr's doctrines is here discussed, not the doctrines themselves.

ceeded in reconciling the contradiction between its own nationalism and Marxian internationalism—either in its strategy or in its ideology, as is demonstrated by the painful distinctions between "bourgeois cosmopolitanism" and genuine internationalism, between chauvinism and "Soviet patriotism." Moreover, the emphasis on a special Soviet mentality, logic, linguistic, and so forth, was bound to impair the appeal to international solidarity in the ultimate revolutionary objective as well as the appeal for peaceful coexistence, which the doctrine of socialism or communism in one country could not discard altogether. The "Marrist" theories may have fulfilled a useful function in the "magical" utilization of Marxian theory, but with the technological and industrial progress of Soviet society, with the growing political and strategic power of the Soviet state, they came into conflict with more fundamental objectives. As Soviet policy began to be oriented to the transition to the "second phase," the Marrist doctrines had to give way to more universalist, "normal," and internationalist conceptions. Far from signifying the "arrest" of dialectic in the interest of the stabilization of the attained level of development, the reiteration of the common human function and content of language and logic seems to be aimed at bringing the ideology in line with the drive toward the "next higher stage" of the development, that is, the second phase of socialism, and with the policy of "normalizing" East-West relations involved in this transition.